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We find a high prevalence of Europeans giving equal financial transfers to their adult 
children, regardless of siblings’ income differences. This behaviour is sharply 
different from previously documented for American counterparts and it is not 
predicted by any conventional model on family transfers. We build a model to explain 
the motives for European parental transfers which includes concern with fairness and 
leaves altruism as an additional motive. We show that, in contrast to the prediction of 
the pure altruism model, parents do not offset income inequality among their children 
but decide to give equal transfers in order to be “fair”. However, the parents might 
start to give larger transfers to poorer children if the siblings’ income inequality 
becomes unbearable from the parent’s view. We find evidence for this behaviour 
using simulations for parameter’s distributions and also microeconomic data of 9 
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1. Introduction  
In a broad sense, there are two competing approaches to explain monetary and 
time transfers within the family: altruism and exchange. If the family members are 
linked by altruism, then their actions are driven by the concern of the well-being of 
each other. This approach was originated by Becker (1974) and Barro (1974) who 
stressed one of the most important (and strongest) implications of the altruistic 
regime: the neutrality result. It means that a non-distortionary intergenerational 
redistribution policy is neutralized when the family is linked by altruism. For instance, 
an increase in the income of the younger generation as result of a decrease in income 
taxes and financed by a reduction on the pensions of the elderly can be neutralized by 
the parents who, in turn, lower the transfers to their children. Contrary, in the 
exchange approach (Bernheim et al, 1985 and Cox, 1987) there is no crowding out of 
the redistribution policies. In this regime the parents give financial transfers to their 
children as a sort of payment for the time (or services) received from them in the form 
of help, visits, etc. Thus, an increase in the child income raises the price for the child 
service and might raise the corresponding payment, which does not neutralize the 
redistribution policy. Therefore, finding of motive for transfers is an important issue 
as it allows us to evaluate to which extent the redistribution policies can be crowded 
out or reinforced. In general, under altruism, the child income and the transfer amount 
are negatively related; while in the exchange setting, this relation should be positive. 
Regularly it is found that the neutrality result does not hold and hence some authors 
have discarded the altruism as the motive to give transfers
1. However, this is not 
sufficient to rule out altruistic motivations in favour of exchange. There are facts such 
as imperfect information of parents about income and labour opportunities of their 
descendants under which the neutrality prediction does not necessarily hold 
(McGarry, 1999; Villanueva, 2002 and Feinerman and Seiler, 2002). In this matter, 
Laferrere and Wolff (2006) and Arrondel and Masson (2006) offer a comprehensive 
review of the literature on family transfers. Cox & Fafchamps (2008) also present a 
review on transfers but with a focus beyond the income effects on transfers.  
Many studies show that transfers are given disproportionately to children 
while bequests are mainly equally shared. Always with US data, in Dunn and Phillips 
                                                 
1 In Cox (1987), Cox & Rank (1992), Cox & Jakubson (1995), Cox et al (1998), Altonji et al (1997) 
and Arrondel & Laferrere (2001), altruism is rejected. In the first four studies, exchange is accepted as 
the motive for making transfers.   4
(1997), Wilhem (1996), McGarry (1999) and Norton & Van Houtven (2006), more 
than 80% of the families intended to give equal inheritances. By contrast, only 17.7% 
of the mothers from Light and McGarry (2004) give equal transfers to their adult 
children. Using the Health and Retirement Study dataset (HRS), McGarry (1999) 
finds that 6.4% of the households give equal transfers to their adult and non co-
resident children, and this percentage is 7% in McGarry & Schoeni (1995). With the 
same dataset for years 1992-2002, we can infer from the results of Hochguertel and 
Ohlsson (2008) that between 4.8% and 12.5% of households give equal transfers to 
their children, although these figures include children of any age and residing or not 
in the same home with the parents. Since the majority of parents make equal division 
of states among their children, considerable research has been devoted to understand 
this fact, overlooking the explanation for equal transfers. However, information from 
the “Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe” (SHARE) shows striking 
results which could not be explained by the standard approaches from the literature on 
transfers. The prevalence of equal transfers between siblings is remarkably higher in 
Europe than in US (see table 1).  
The existence of equal transfers might be caused by a social norm that 
stipulates to treat children equally. In behavioural economic experiments, fairness is a 
norm that commonly emerges (see Camerer and Fehr, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 2002) 
from the interaction among individuals. Interestingly, the greater preference of the 
Europeans for more equality with respect to the Americans might help to understand 
the found results (see Alesina et al, 2004). Beyond the traditional income effects 
explored in the family transfer literature, we argue that parents may treat their 
children equally regardless of the differences of income among siblings. Thus, the 
parents do not offset income inequality among their children by giving larger transfers 
to poorer children, but decide to give equal transfers in order to be fair. However, the 
parents may start to give larger transfers to the poorer children (such as is predicted 
by the altruistic regime) if the income inequality among siblings becomes unbearable 
from the parent’s view.  
We contribute to the study of family transfers by incorporating new elements 
such as the parental concern with fairness derived from a social norm and the degree 
of income inequality among siblings. We do not intend to rule out or accept altruism 
as the motive to give transfers, but use it as an additional motive for transfers. Indeed, 
our theoretical model does not predict full intergenerational nor intra-generational   5
neutrality results such as the standard model of altruistic transfers. As we will see in 
the next section, the societies with a stronger concern with fairness and lower income 
inequality among siblings show a larger prevalence of equal transfers. In these types 
of societies the redistribution policies can still be effective. To support our findings, 
we use microeconomic data from SHARE for 9 European countries about the 
relationship between the prevalence of equal transfers and income differences among 
siblings. The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model for parental 
transfers, the implications for the neutrality results and simulate the model; section 3 
describes the data and the regression analysis and discusses the results; and finally, in 
section 4 we conclude.  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
We focus our attention on monetary transfers which go from parents to non 
co-resident adult children, while the transfers of time services go from children to 
parents. In the next sections we develop a model for parental transfers considering 
heterogeneity on altruism, concern with fairness and siblings’ income inequality. 
 
2.1 The model 
Each family is composed of one parent and two children
2. The parent is 
altruistic towards her children, so that the child utility levels enter in her own utility 
function. Thus, the parent wants to equalize marginal consumption between her and 
her children by adjusting transfers adequately. Since children generally show different 
income levels, it is expected that each child receives a different amount of transfer. 
However, the parent faces a trade-off. On the one hand, she wants to equalize 
marginal consumption by giving unequal transfers, but on the other hand she also 
wants to be fair by giving equal transfer amounts regardless of siblings’ income 
differences
3. Nevertheless, such desire has a limit because giving equal transfers 
precludes the parent to improve income distribution among her children by equalizing 
                                                 
2 We assume that the father and mother behave as a unit, so we do not account for any couple decision 
making process. 
3 In terms of Kolm (2006), parents may give equal transfers because they have a constraint to be fair. 
This constraint may have its origin in a social norm that dictates to treat all siblings equally. This is the 
justification used by Lundholm & Ohlsson (2000) who argue that giving unequal bequests damages 
parent’s reputation.   6
marginal consumption, which in turn, hurts the parent
4. Furthermore, equal transfers 
imply loss of utility for the parent, which might become unbearable eventually. 
Therefore, the parent maximises the following utility function and chooses the 
optimal values for the transfers  j T  and child services  j S  (help, companionship, visits, 
etc) of each child j:   
 
[] X T T S C S C S S C U p γ γ β + − − − + + − + + + + + =
2
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p C  is the parental consumption,  j C  is the consumption of the child j (j=1,2), 
j I denotes the pre-transfer income and β  is the parameter for parental altruism; the 
larger this parameter, the more important the child’s wellbeing is for the parent. The 
last two expressions in the right side of equation 1 account for the dissatisfaction of 
the parent when she gives unequal transfers and for her tolerance on the utility losses. 
We can understand 
2
1 2 ) ( T T − γ  as a constraint of the parent to be fair. The parent 
prefers to give equal transfers in order to be fair, so that giving unequal transfers 
reduces her utility. The parameter γ  measures the size of the concern with fairness; 
naturally if γ =0, the parent has not any concern in being fair and the parental utility 
would be the traditionally used in a pure altruism setting. Since giving equal transfers 
implies loss of utility with respect to giving unequal transfers, the expression 
X γ refers to the maximum loss of utility the parent is willing to bear. To understand 
this point, we can reformulate the maximization problem (1)-(6) as the comparison 
                                                 
4 The altruistic nature of the parent determines that in the optimum, she equalizes marginal 
consumption between her and her children by giving larger transfers to the poorer child. Thus, giving 
equal transfers to the children who have different income levels causes utility losses.    7
between the indirect utilities when the parent gives unequal (V
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T is the optimal value for equal transfers. 8a is always larger than 8b evaluated 
at optimal values (assuming equation 5 is not binding) and the condition to give equal 
transfers is 
u e V V ≥ +γ ; therefore γ  also indicates the maximum bearable utility loss 
of giving equal transfers instead of giving unequal transfers. This is just the other side 
of the coin: a parent who is more concerned with fairness (higherγ ) is also willing to 
tolerate a larger utility loss for giving equal transfers. 
The way the services enter in the optimization problem is made for simplicity 
and also reveals the fact that the parent obtains utility from services, while the 
opposite occurs to children. Due to the logarithmic form assumed for the utility 
functions, the consumption level of each child should be identical at the optimum 
when γ  is zero. This means that the parent is able to offset child income inequality by 
giving unequal transfers to perfectly equalize consumption. However, recall that the 
parent also wants to give equal transfers to fulfil her desire of fairness. Doing so, the 
child consumption levels will be different and hence some degree of inequality on 
siblings’ consumption appears.  
The parent solves the optimization problem in two stages; firstly she finds the 
optimal values of transfers and time services that maximize V
u and V
e, and secondly 
she chooses to give equal or unequal transfers according to equation 7. In the first 
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The analytical expressions of the optimal results for the value of transfers are 
complex. Instead, we are more interested to find the partial derivatives of the transfers 
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We observe that the transfer amount increases with the parental income; 
likewise, there is a negative relation between the transfer and the income of the child 
who receives the transfer. So far, these results are in line with a pure altruistic setting. 
In contrast, our results differ when we observe the intra-generational derivatives 
(which only apply to unequal transfers). In a pure altruism setting (see Laferrere and 
Wolff, 2006),  k j I T ∂ ∂ should be positive because the increase of the income of one 
child reduces his transfer, so that the parent can give more resources to the other 
child. In our results,  k j I T ∂ ∂  can also be positive when γ  is small enough, i.e. when 
the parent is not very concerned with fairness. In a pure altruistic setting, an increase 
of the income of child k lowers the transfers he receives and leads to widen the 
difference with respect to the transfer of child j. However, in our setting, the parent 
can reduce the transfer to the child j (instead of increase) in order to shorten the 
difference between the transfer amounts, and hence fulfil her constraint on fairness. 
We present in the appendix the results for corner solutions. Like other transfer 
models (e.g. Cox, 1987), we compare the marginal utility of consumption of one child 
with that of his parent when there is not a transfer, i.e. when the consumption of each 
party is composed only of his own income. The transfer occurs when the marginal   9
utility of consumption of the child is larger than parent’s. Only under this condition, 
the parent finds optimal to make a transfer. Thus, we can define the latent variable 
p j C U C U z ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ = *  for child j and set that  0 > j T  when  0 * > z  and zero 
otherwise. The parental income and sibling’s income positively affect the latent 
variable that determines the decision to transfer, which is quite intuitive. A richer 
parent has more means to give a transfer to her child, while a richer sibling frees 
resources that can be devoted to the other child. In this regard, Laferrere and Wolff 
(2006) argue that the transfers are substitutes when there are many recipients. Finally, 
the own income of child j inversely affects the latent variable, which also is intuitive. 
Concerning to the services supplied to parents, it is easily observable from the 
first order conditions of S1 and S2 that  ) 2 1 /( ) 1 ( 2 1 β β + − = = S S , which holds for both 
unequal and equal transfers. Therefore, the amount of services is independent of the 
level of transfers and incomes, which contrasts sharply with the implications of the 
exchange regime
5. We concentrate our attention on the monetary transfers. 
We can observe the probability of giving equal or unequal transfers by using a 
latent variable approach. Define  
u e V V t − + = γ *  as a latent variable for which the 
parent gives equal transfers if  0 *> t , otherwise the parent gives unequal transfers. It 
is instructive to observe how the probability of giving equal transfers is affected when 
there are changes in the difference between sibling’s income and in the parameter 
values. Define  k j I I − = θ  as a measure for income inequality between the siblings of 
a family such that  k j I I > and maintain one of the incomes fixed. In the appendix we 
show that  0 * < ∂ ∂ θ t . Therefore, the probability of giving equal transfers is lower in 
the families that exhibit more siblings’ income inequality. This can be interpreted as 
that the parent wants to give equal transfers in order to obey her fairness, and hence 
she does not relieve income inequality between her children. However, when this 
inequality widens, the parent starts to give unequal transfers. 
The parameters for altruism and concern with fairness have different effects 
on the latent variable. In the appendix, we show 0 * > ∂ ∂ γ t . This result accords with 
the intuition that a parent who is more worried in being fair, is more likely to allocate 
equal transfers. In contrast, the altruism can affect the latent variable positively and 
                                                 
5 Like the case of the basic model of an altruistic parent and her child in Laferrere and Wolff (2006), 
our model neither predicts an unambiguous relation between the income of the child and his services 
provided to his parent.   10
negatively. In the region of low values of altruism the latent variable increases with 
the value of the altruistic parameter and hence the probability of giving equal transfers 
increases; the opposite occurs in the region of high values of altruism (see appendix). 
For low values of altruism, the gains of parental utility come mainly from reductions 
in the term 
2
1 2 ) ( T T − γ  of the equation 1, so that the parent tries to shorten the 
transfer’s gap when the altruistic parameter increases. Hence, it is more likely that the 
parent transfers equal amounts to her children. On the other hand, for high values of 
altruism the parent losses more utility when she is not able to give different transfer 
amounts. When the altruistic parameter is larger, the well-being of the children 
accounts for a greater part of the parent’s utility. And according to the first order 
conditions we observe that the parent maximizes her utility and that of her children by 
giving unequal transfers. Hence, the probability of giving equal transfers diminishes 
when the altruistic parameter is larger. We can conclude that the level of altruism is 
not very informative about the existence of equal transfers in the family because a 
given level for the latent variable (and its corresponding probability) can be 
compatible with two different values of the altruistic parameter. In other words, we 
might expect that the relation between altruism and the probability of giving equal 
transfers is a U inverted type. 
In sum, the model predicts a positive relation for i) the transfer amount and the 
parental income, ii) the probability of giving a transfer and the parental income, and 
iii) the probability of giving a transfer and the sibling’s income; and a negative 
relation for iv) the transfer amount and the child’s income, and v) the probability of 
giving a transfer and the child’s income. The model does not predict an unambiguous 
relation between the amount of the transfer and the sibling’s income; however, if the 
parent is concerned enough with fairness, the relation might be negative, which 
contrasts with the implication of a pure altruism setting. Regarding the results for the 
probability of giving equal transfers, the model predicts a negative relation with the 
siblings’ income inequality and a positive relation with the concern with fairness; and 
there is not an unambiguous relation for the relation with altruism.  
Due to the complexity to find the analytical solutions for the optimal values of 
the model, we calibrate the model in section 2.3 by simulating distributions of the 
parameters. Furthermore, the above-mentioned results are tested in the econometric 
section by using the database SHARE. Since one of the main objectives to study the   11
transfers within family is to analyse the effects of redistribution policies, the next 
section presents the implications of our model on the neutrality results of 
redistribution policies. And similar to the derivatives of the model, we also perform 
simulations and test the neutrality results.  
 
2.2 Implications for the neutrality results  
If a policy dictates to take one Euro from one child and give it to the parent, 
the parent neutralises such policy by increasing her transfer to the child by one Euro 
exactly. This is, essentially, the neutrality result for redistributive policies between 
generations (Becker, 1974 and Barro, 1974). The intra-generational neutrality result 
states that if one Euro is taken from one child and given to the other, then the parent 
neutralises it by adjusting her transfers accordingly.  
The optimal transfers depend on the family members’ incomes: 
) I , I , (I T p 2 1 i = i T . Take total derivatives with respect to the incomes of two members, 
maintaining the other constant, and make the exercise taking one Euro from one child 
and giving it to the other, or taking one Euro from the child and giving it to the parent 
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The neutrality results appear when each of the preceding expressions is equal 
to -1, and this is the case in a pure altruism setting. For Laferrere and Wolff (2006) 
k j j j j j I T I T dI dT ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ = − = 1  and  p j j j p j I T I T dI dT ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ = − = 1  are the 
intra-generational and intergenerational neutrality result, respectively, for  2 , 1 = ≠ j k .  
This means that the parent fully replaces, by adjusting her transfers, the Euro that the 
Government took from one child and gave to the other; and gives back the Euro she 
received from her child. These results neutralize the redistributive policies both 
between and within generations. In General, the hypothesis of the neutrality result is 
rejected when it is tested and some authors consider it as a proof against the   12
importance of the altruism as the motive to give transfers in the family (which is too 
strong). Based on this regular finding, the exchange approach (Bernheim et al, 1985 
and Cox, 1987) appeared as an alternative explanation. In such approach, there is a 
participation constraint under which the child offers his time services to his parent 
only if he is compensated enough with the parental transfer. The child receives 
transfers as a “payment” for his time, so that the exchange is the motive that 
determines, at the margin, the amount transferred. Under this setting there is no 
crowding out of the redistribution policies, as is the case in the neutrality result. 
However, we consider it is unnecessary to make assumptions of the sort of the 
participation constraint within the family to establish that the neutrality results do not 
hold. If the parents are concerned with being fair, as in our model, the neutrality 
results do not hold. In the appendix we show that dTi/dIp>-1 and dTi/dIi≠-1
6. 
Intuitively, a parent who is concerned with fairness will not fully compensate a 
change of the income of her children because she also suffers when the difference 
between the transfers to her children enlarges. Therefore, the redistribution policies 
still have room to be effective, depending on the characteristics of the distribution of 
parametersβ , γ  andθ
7. In the next section we consider heterogeneous families that 
have different values for those parameters, and compute the probability of giving 
equal transfers and the size of the neutrality results. 
 
2.3 A numerical example to account for heterogeneity on altruism, 
concern with fairness and sibling’s income 
The parent of each family has a different value of β  and γ , so that () γ β,  
defines the type for the parent. Likewise, each family exhibits a different degree of 
sibling’s income inequality θ . Assumeβ ,  γ  and θ  are drawn independently from 
continuous distributions  ) (β b  ,  ) (γ g  and  ) (θ h
8. Thus, using parameter values drawn 
from the preceding distributions, we can “observe” the latent variable t* and compute 
                                                 
6 The results also are coherent with the case of equal transfers and are presented in the appendix as 
well. 
7 Similarly, Mitrut & Nordblom (2007) consider that the social norms of duty and reciprocity govern 
transfers rather than an altruistic income distribution, which also weaken the idea of the crowding-out 
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the proportion of the population that give equal transfers. This setting helps us to 
compare different outcomes in societies that differ on the distribution of altruism, 
concern with fairness and siblings’ income inequality. For instance, if the cdf’s of θ  
are  ) ( 1 θ H  and  ) ( 2 θ H  such that  ) ( ≥ ) ( 2 1 θ θ H H  for all θ  in the support [] θ , 0  (i.e. 
society 1 is less equally distributed), and all other things equal; then the proportion of 
population giving equal transfers in society 1 is lower than in society 2. Likewise, a 
larger part of families gives equal transfers in a society where its members are more 
concerned with fairness. This can easily be observed by computing the latent variable 
t* using the distributions of footnote 8. The results of this exercise are in table 2. In 
the first simulation
9, we observe that 34.3% of the parents give equal transfers. If we 
allow a more equal distribution of siblings’ income by modifying the distribution’s 
parameters accordingly, then the fraction of parents giving equal transfers increases to 
52.1% (second column). The third simulation shows the effect of an increase of the 
concern with fairness among the population. In that situation, the parents can tolerate 
larger differences between the incomes of their children, so that more of them (59%) 
are prompted to give equal transfers. In the last column, we consider the parents 
becoming less altruistic. Since β was concentrated in high levels, the reduction of the 
altruistic feeling causes a raise of 3.1% in the probability of giving equal transfers. All 
these results accord the implications of our model. 
The results regarding the influence of the siblings’ income distribution and the 
concern with fairness on the prevalence of equal transfers are remarkable. A larger 
portion of parents give equal transfers in a society with low income differences 
among siblings and whose members are more concerned with being fair. The opposite 
happens in a society less concerned with fairness and with child incomes more 
unequally distributed. We presume that some European countries may be examples 
for the first type of society while the US may be closer to the second type. This could 
explain the small fraction of parents giving equal transfers in US and the higher 
prevalence of equal transfers in Europe (see table 1). 
The neutrality results are computed for each family, and the average is 
reported in table 3. As in our predictions, the intergenerational result is larger than -1 
for both children. The parent gives back between 0.35 and 0.49 of the Euro that she 
previously received from the child 1. The size of the neutralization is bigger when the 
                                                 
9 We assume that I2 is fixed and also I2< I1.    14
Euro is taken from the poorer child (child 2), which ranges from 0.70 to 0.81. The 
intra-generational result can be negative or positive from child 1’s view but only 
negative from the view of child 2. When the Government transfers one Euro from the 
richer child to the poorer one, the parent can reduce the total amount of her total 
transfers and obtain more utility by increasing her own consumption. In doing so, it is 
possible that the parent decreases (instead of increase) the transfer to the richer 
children if she is concerned enough with fairness. This is the reason why dT1/dI1 can 
be positive (see the appendix). In contrast, if the Government transfers one Euro from 
the poorer child to the richer one, the parent has to remedy this increase in child 
income inequality by transferring more money to the poorer child, regardless of the 
level of γ . The size of neutralization for this case ranges from 0.30 to 0.48. These 
effects contrast notably with the implications of a pure altruism setting where the 
crowding out is perfect. Therefore, a redistributive policy can be effective under the 
features of our model.  
Although the preceding simulations help us to observe how the model works 
in a context of heterogeneity and allow us to overcome the difficulty to find analytical 
solutions, the use of microeconomic data might give more insights on the behaviour 
of European families with regard to parental transfers. Thus, we take advantage of 
SHARE -a new European dataset with rich information on parental transfer’s 
characteristics- to find econometric support for the model. The next section is devoted 
to the econometric analysis. 
 
3. Data, empirical strategy and results 
3.1 The data 
We use the first wave of SHARE released 2.0.1 which has representative and 
comparable information from standardised surveys applied to people over 50 years 
old in Israel and 11 European countries: Austria, Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands, 
Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Greece, Switzerland and Belgium. The interviews 
were taken between April and October 2004. Variables are at individual, household 
and couple level. In total, SHARE includes 45,051 respondents distributed in 21,336 
households
10. There are key questions regarding frequency, type and amount of time 
                                                 
10 See Börsch-Supan et al (2005) and in Börsch-Supan and Jürges (2005) for detailed information on 
the dataset and methodology.   15
and monetary transfers (over 250 euros) given or received during the last year. It is 
also possible to identify the family relation between the recipient and provider. 
Likewise, there is detailed information regarding parents’ demographic variables, but 
partial information for children. 
We drop observations in which it is not possible to identify the gender, age 
and number of children of the respondent, or the household income is missing or zero. 
Due to our interest in European countries, we delete observations from Israel. The 
cases from Switzerland are also dropped because we cannot impute labour income for 
children
11. Since individual characteristics of children matters for the analysis of 
transfers, we create a new dataset which includes all respondents’ children; thus, each 
child is one observation. When two respondents live in the same household and are 
couple, we include their children only once. 
Like other studies, children living in the same household with their parents or 
less than 18 years old are not included. We agree with the reasons pointed by 
McGarry (1999) under which transfers to children aged less than 18 might be due to 
legal obligations, while in the case of co-resident children, it is difficult to quantify 
the value of shared food and housing. We also drop children in retirement or early 
retirement, and those permanently sick or disabled. The former were deleted because 
it is not possible to impute incomes for them and the latter are not considered because 
they are not able to offer time transfers to parents. Due to the theoretical insights we 
intend to prove, our dataset only includes those children who have at least one sibling. 
After all these selections, the dataset contains 22,813 observations of children
12. The 
definition and computing of variables that enter in the analysis are explained in table 4 
while the means and standard errors are reported in table 5.  
Similarly to other datasets based on middle age interviewees, in SHARE there 
is no direct information for children’s income. However, we can impute this variable 
by introducing some child demographics into the earnings equation estimated with 
other dataset. This equation is estimated for each country, and broken by gender, with 
information from the European Community Household Panel database (ECHP, wave 
                                                 
11 Belgium is not considered because currently there is an error in the processing of the education 
variable for respondents’ children, so that we could not impute children’s labour income. 
12 In SHARE, the demographic information for children is registered up to four children. However, it 
represents 94.3% of total respondents’ children in our sample.    16
8, year 2001)
13. Other authors also impute earnings to solve the lack of information 
either for children or for parents. For example, assuming that children and parents live 
near each other, Cox (1987) and Cox and Jakubson (1995) use the average income of 
the metropolitan areas where children live to approximate the parental income. Cox 
and Rank (1992) use earnings functions estimated with the same dataset that contains 
child information to impute parental income at the standardized age of 45. McGarry 
(1999) uses the mid points of child income intervals, answered by the parents, to 
impute child income. Although it would be desirable to correct the earnings equations 
for sample selection, there is not enough demographic information in SHARE for 
respondents’ children. However, as suggested by Harmon et al (2003) in their analysis 
on the returns to education in European countries, some sample bias could exist but 
this appears not to be large.   
 
3.2 Empirical strategy 
As in other similar studies, we first analyse the probability that a child receives 
a transfer from his parent. The dependent variable is a latent variable zi*. However, 
we only observe zi which takes the value of 1 if the latent variable is zi*>0, i.e. the 
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Xkj includes the characteristics of the child and his parents. Assuming εj is 
normally distributed with zero mean, we estimate a probit equation. According to the 
theoretical model, we should expect a positive effect of the parental income and 
sibling’s income on the probability of giving a transfer. Likewise, the effect of the 
child’s own income should be negative. Secondly, we use a type I Tobit model 
regression to test the derivatives implied in the theoretical model. The dependent 
variable is the amount of transfer in euros (divided by the purchasing power parity 
                                                 
13 The ECHP is a dataset widely used in economic research and according to some examinations shown 
in Börsch-Supan et al (2005), it has similar distributions to those of SHARE in key concepts like 
employment, income, education and health. We construct the dependent variable (log of hourly labour 
income) using the yearly net wage and the variables that enter into the country-gender regressions also 
are measured in SHARE, i.e. age and its square, marital status and education level. The results (not 
reported but available at request) perform well and the estimated incomes per country show a ranking 
similar to other studies (e.g. Brunello et al, 2007).   17
ratio, ppp) received by child j (Tj) and the explanatory variables are the same that 
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j μ  is the error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed. Although 
some studies use a type II Tobit model (Cox, 1987; Cox & Rank, 1992 and Arrondel 
& Laferrere, 2001 are some examples) we favour a type I model. This type of model 
is also used by Schoeni (1997), Hochguertel & Ohlsson (2008), Sloan et al (2002) and 
Cigno et al (2004)
14. The estimated coefficients are conditioned on transfer amount 
censored at zero value; thus the results must be interpreted as conditioned on positive 
transfers. Since the dataset includes observations of siblings who share common 
familial characteristics, it is adequate to consider clustering for the estimation of 
robust standard errors. Thus, in the variance-covariance matrix, all siblings from the 
same family are treated as a particular cluster. 
As third regression model, we run a probit model for the probability of giving 
equal transfers. In this case, the unity of analysis is the household. The dependent 
variable takes value 1 if the parents give equal transfers to all their children, and zero 
otherwise. The expected results of this regression model are fully described in the 
theoretical model. Similar to McGarry (1999), we only consider households where the 
parents make at least one transfer to one of their children. The author argues that zero 
transfers to all children do not mean a desire to treat all of them equally. 
 
3.3 Results 
Tables 6 and 7 show the results for the decision and amount of transfer. As 
expected, parental and child income are significant and positively and negatively 
affect the decision to transfer, respectively. Likewise, the income of the sibling 
increases the probability of receiving a transfer, which suggests that child and 
sibling’s income are substitutes. The results are the same in the Tobit regression. The 
                                                 
14 We favour a type I model because of the characteristics of our data and dependent variable. The 
transfers are censored at zero when the parent does not make a transfer; however, our dataset contains 
the full characteristics of the parents who provide (or not) transfers to their children. We take advantage 
of this fact by using the full sample such as it is recommended in Wooldridge (2002).   18
magnitude of the effects of income variables in the transfer probability is not too high. 
An increase of 10,000 Euros in the yearly income of the parent, child or sibling 
affects the probability of receiving a transfer by 0.3%, -2.1% and 0.49% respectively. 
The same boost in the parental income positively affects the amount transferred by 
183 Euros, while such increase in child income reduces the transfer amount by 860 
Euros. Recall from section 2.2 that neutrality results hold when the corresponding 
subtraction of derivatives is equal to -1. Clearly, neither intergenerational neutrality 
result (-0.086-0.018=-0.104) nor intra-generational result (-0.086-0.053=-0.139) hold; 
we reject at large significant levels that they are not different from -1.  
Education and health status are also significant variables. More educated and 
healthy parents can give larger transfers and with more probability, which is quite 
intuitive. The level of education of the child increases the probability to receive 
transfers from parents. McGarry (1999) argues that schooling of child is viewed as a 
proxy for permanent income and thus, holding current income constant, a higher 
permanent income suggests the child is more liquidity constrained and therefore has a 
greater probability to receive a transfer. Likewise, McGarry (1999) and Cox & Rank 
(1992) point out that education may include effects of past transfers: parents who 
were generous in the past with the expenditures on child education are also generous 
in the present with transfers
15. Age of children is negatively related to the probability 
and amount of transfers. This result accords with the fact that children belonging to 
earlier stages of life-cycle are more liquidity constrained and need more financial 
support from their parents. 
In our sample, a married child has less possibility to receive a transfer and also 
receives smaller amounts of transfers. A priori, the final effect of child’s marital status 
is not clear; a spouse can raise the family income, bringing to the household her own 
resources, or decreases the income per capita if she does not bring any income. In the 
first case, the probability of receiving a transfer would decrease while in the second 
case it would raise. Furthermore, having a spouse implies another set of parents who 
could help with more transfers. The gender of the child does not matter statistically in 
the chances to receive a transfer. The number of children (or grandchildren from the 
parents’ view) enters significantly and positively in the probit and Tobit regressions, 
                                                 
15 Due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is not possible to account for past transfers. 
Furthermore, given the scarcity of information for children in the dataset, there are not child’s 
demographic variables available that are correlated with schooling but not with the decision and 
amount of transfers, so that we could not find adequate instruments.     19
which is understandable since an additional grandchild exerts extra expenses and 
reduces income per capita in the child’s home. The regressions show that the 
coefficient for number of siblings is negative and significant. Siblings may be seen as 
competitors to receive transfers and it is clear that the more siblings the lower 
probability to get a transfer and the lower amount.  
The variables hours of help, contact with parents and distance from parental 
home, are proxies for the child services Sj that we described in the theoretical 
framework. In particular, the variable most related to child service is hours of help but 
it is not significant in any regression. Contrary, the frequency of contact with parents 
and the distance between child and parental home are both positive and significant
16. 
Recall from our theoretical implications that there is not an exact relation between 
transfers and child services. 
Table 8 shows the results for the probability of giving equal transfers. The unit 
of analysis is the household, thus the variables related to children are expressed in 
relative terms. For instance, the variable for children income is the positive difference 
between the maximum and minimum value of the incomes of children belonging to 
the same family. Only for the variable distance from parental home, we use a ratio 
between the maximum and minimum value instead of difference in order to control 
for important country differences in territory size. The variable of main interest is the 
difference between siblings’ income, i.e. the θ from our theoretical framework. This 
variable is significant and negative, which accords with our predictions: the larger the 
siblings’ income inequality, the lower the probability of giving equal transfers. For 
example, an increase of 1,000 euros in the difference between yearly child incomes 
reduces the probability of giving equal transfers by 0.94%. The difference in the 
values of contact with parents among siblings is significant but not in distance from 
parental and hours of help. There is not a clear picture about the effects of child 
services on the probability of giving equal transfer, but apparently larger differences 
in contact frequency shown by children may drive parents to reduce the probability of 
giving equal transfers.  
                                                 
16 Cox & Rank (1992) consider that the distance between child and parental home is a proxy for the 
provision of child services, since services are more costly to offer when the child lives further from his 
parent’s home. They find that distance negatively affects the decision to give transfers, and argue that 
this finding lends support to the idea of transfers being governed by exchange motives. However, we 
find a positive relation, which is not expected in the exchange regime.      20
According to our model, there is not a linear relation between the parent’s 
altruism and the probability of giving equal transfers. We argued that a given 
probability of giving equal transfers may be compatible with two different degrees of 
altruism. In the survey there is not a variable that can measure the parental altruism 
itself, but we found a proxy measured for the sample of persons who completed the 
self-administered questionnaire of SHARE. Individuals who participated in such 
questionnaire were asked how much they agree with the next statement: “parents’ 
duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being". 
The responses range from 1=strongly agree to 5=strongly disagree. In figure 1, we 
consider that 1 is the highest value for the altruism of one person and 5 is the lowest. 
Although the evidence is not conclusive, the non-linear relation depicted in figure 1 
suggests that a given probability of equal transfers is compatible with different levels 
of altruism. We do not include the proxy for altruism in our precedent regressions 
because the sample would be considerably reduced
17, and self-selection problems 
might appear due to the nature of the drop-off questionnaire.   
It is worth to mention that our results, particularly on the decision to transfer 
may be due to or influenced by income shocks suffered by the children before the date 
of the survey application; but nevertheless the cross-sectional nature of the data does 
not allow us to account for those past shocks
18. Furthermore, we find that our results 
can be comparable to those that use American data. For instance, the coefficient of 
variation of the parental income in our sample is rather similar to that of McGarry 
(1999) and McGarry & Schoeni (1995) who use the HRS and AHEAD datasets. 
Although it would be ideal to measure the percentage that the transfers represent with 
respect to the child’s income in the studios made with European and American data, 
there is only available and comparable data for parental income. And we find that the 
proportion of the transfers with respect to the parental income is similar. Thus, 
differences between European and American parents with respect to their transfer 
                                                 
17 It may reduce the sample from 1,552 to 1,075 observations. The coefficient of this proxy is not 
significant when it is included (linearly or non-linearly) in the last probit regression. Furthermore, this 
variable is not highly correlated with the other covariates. 
18 The only available variable potentially related to an income shock is the current employment 
(unemployment) status of the child; but its inclusion in the first two regressions, as a dummy variable 
indicating that the child is unemployed, does not change the results. The coefficient was positive and 
significant in both cases.   21
behaviour do not necessarily rely on sample design differences or on sharp income 
variability
19.    
 
4. Conclusion 
According to the survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE, 
release 2.0.1) we observe that there is a high prevalence of Europeans giving equal 
financial transfers to their adult children, regardless of siblings’ income differences. 
This behaviour is not predicted by any conventional model on family transfers. We 
intend to explain this conduct by modelling parental transfers as altruistically and 
fairly determined. We include explicitly a parameter for the parent’s concern with 
fairness. For fairness, we understand equal transfers to each sibling.  
In our model the type of the parent is defined by her degree of altruism and 
concern with fairness. Likewise, children show different levels of income, so that we 
can build a measure for income inequality among siblings within family. We argue 
the parents do not relieve income inequality among their children (as in the pure 
altruism model) and decide to give equal transfers in order to fulfil a constraint to be 
fair. However, the parents might start to give larger transfers to the poorer children if 
the income inequality among siblings becomes unbearable. Contrary to the pure 
altruism model, the intra-generational and intergenerational neutrality results of the 
redistribution policies of our model do not hold, and therefore there is still room so 
that such policies are effective. This aspect coincides with the results from other 
altruistic-based models that have relaxed the Becker-Barro’s neutrality results. 
Applying simulations, the predictions of our model are still valid when we add 
heterogeneity (by simulating) in the parental parameters of altruism and concern with 
fairness, and in the sibling’s income inequality for each family. Furthermore, 
European microeconomic data from SHARE allows us to find evidence for a negative 
effect of sibling’s income inequality on the probability of giving equal transfers. 
Finally, almost all partial derivatives from our model find support on the econometric 
results for the corner and interior solutions.  
                                                 
19 The coefficient of variation for the parental income in our sample is 0.88, whilst it is 0.85 and 0.90 in 
McGarry (1999) for the HRS and AHEAD datasets, respectively. This is 1.09 in McGarry & Schoeni 
(1995). The proportion of the transfers with respect to the parental income is 0.07 in our sample and in 
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% of households where children receive equal transfers* 
 
Country %  N 
Austria   29.1 134 
Germany   25.2 210 
Sweden  42.4 396 
Netherlands   31.1 212 
Spain   12.5 40 
Italy   27.3 88 
France   32.8 183 
Denmark   40.0 160 
Greece   14.6 158 
Total  31.8 1,581 
                                                 *Calculated for parents with at least two children and conditional on  
                                                  the existence of at least one child receiving transfers. 
                                                  Source: SHARE-Release 2.0.1. Own calculations.  






% of parents giving equal transfers 
 
Parameter values for:     #1  #2 #3 #4 
Altruism  a  4 4 4 2 
    b  2 2 2 2 
Concern with fairness  k  0,5  0,5  0,5  0,5 
   λ 0,3  0,3  0,5  0,5 
Child income inequality  m  3  3  3  3 
   δ 80 20 20 20 
               
% of parents giving equal transfers  34.30  52.10  59.00  62.10 








   #1  #2 #3 #4
Intergenerational result  dT1/dIp  -0.35 -0.49 -0.46 -0.38 
 dT2/dIp  -0.81 -0.70 -0.70 -0.77 
Intra-generational result  dT1/dI1 0.17  -0.06  -0.02  0.07 
   dT2/dI2  -0.48 -0.32 -0.30 -0.36 
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Table 4 
Definitions of variables  
 
Variable Description 
Parents   
   Male  If respondent and her spouse are alive or the only one alive is the male it takes 
value 1, otherwise is 0. 
   Married and living 
with couple 
It takes value 1 if the respondent is married or living with a couple, 0 
otherwise. 
   Age  It takes the age of the male if the respondent lives with a couple, otherwise it 
takes the age of the respondent herself.  
   High school  It takes value 1 if the respondent has a high school degree (ISCED-97, 3 & 4). 
If the respondent lives with a couple, we choose the education of the male.  
   Higher education  It takes value 1 if the respondent has a higher degree (ISCED-97, 5 & 6). If the 
respondent lives with a couple, we choose the education of the male. 
At least one parent in 
bad health condition 
It takes value 1 if the respondent or her spouse is in bad or very bad health 
condition, 0 otherwise. 
Number of members 
of Household 
It measures the number of members in the household of the respondent. 
HH income (in 
10,000s) 
It measures the household income of respondent. It is expressed in 10,000s 
euros. 
Children   
   High school  It takes value 1 if the child has a high school degree (ISCED-97, 3 & 4)  
   Higher education  It takes value 1 if the child has a higher degree (ISCED-97, 5 & 6) 
Married and living 
with couple 
It takes value 1 if the child is married or living with a couple, 0 otherwise. 
  Age  It takes the age of the child. 
  Male  It takes 1 if the child is male, 0 otherwise. 
  Yearly ppp labour  
   income 
Imputed from ECHP-wave 8 data set. Expressed in purchasing power parity 
level. 
  Yearly labour ppp 
   income  of siblings 
Mean of yearly ppp labour income of the siblings. 
  Number of siblings  Indicates the number of siblings of the child. 
  Number of children  Indicates the number of children of the child. 
  Hours of help given to 
  parents 
Hours of any kind of help received from children in the last 12 moths, 
adequately computed from frequency reports.  
  Contact with parents 
It measures the daily frequency of contact of respondent with her children. The 
code variable is converted into days as follows: 1)Daily =365; 2)Several times 
a week =182; 3)About once a week=52; 4)About every two weeks=26; 
5)About once a month=12; 6)Less than once a month=6; 7)Never=0. 
Distance from parental 
home 
It measures the distance into kilometres between the respondent’s home and 
that of her children. The code variable is converted in kilometres as follows: 
1)In the same household=0; 2)In the same building=0; 3)Less than 1 kilometer 
away=0.5; 4)Between 1 and 5 kilometers away=2.5; 5)Between 5 and 25 
kilometers away=15; 6)Between 25 and 100 kilometers away=62.5; 
7)Between 100 and 500 kilometers away=300; 8)More than 500 kilometers 
away=500; 9)More than 500 kilometers away in another country=500. 
Others   
 Transfer amount  It indicates the amount in Euros (at least 250 euros) that the respondent gave to 
her child in the last 12 moths. 













Statistics for variables in sample 
 
Variable N  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Dependent variables        
     Transfers received from parents  22813  0.142  0.349 
     Amount of Transfers (ppp Euros)  2856 2893.200 9510.532 
     Equal transfers  1581  0.318  0.466 
Parental Characteristics        
     Male (in couple)  22813  0.658  0.474 
     Married and living with couple  22813  0.678  0.467 
     Age (male in couple)  22813  67.019  9.784 
     High school (male in couple)  22626  0.281  0.450 
     Higher education (male in couple)  22626  0.173  0.378 
     At least one parent in bad health condition  22813  0.147  0.354 
     Number of members of HH  22813  1.973  0.840 
     HH ppp income (in 10,000s)  22813  4.147  4.734 
Child characteristics        
     High school  22513  0.459  0.498 
     Higher education  22513  0.311  0.463 
     Married or living with couple  22703 0.675 0.468 
     Age  22813  38.260  9.459 
     Male  22813  0.493  0.500 
     Yearly labour income (ppp Euros)  22675  12635  8048 
     Yearly labour income of siblings (ppp Euros)  21389  12791  6875 
     Number of siblings  22813  2.136  1.365 
     Number of children  22692  1.311  1.216 
     Hours of help given to parents  22813  96.505  828.310 
     Contact with parents  22735  177.524  134.389 
     Distant from parental home  22769  98.198  157.569 
Country dummies   
     Austria  22813  0.081    
     Germany  22813  0.114    
     Sweden  22813  0.166    
     Netherlands  22813  0.142    
     Spain  22813  0.102    
     Italy  22813  0.087    
     France  22813  0.132    
     Denmark  22813  0.085    

























Probit estimates for transfers received from parents 
 
Variable          Coef.     Rob .Clus. 
Std. Err.  dF/dx Mean 
Parental Characteristics                
     Male (in couple)  0.103**  0.043  0.018  0.66 
     Married and living with couple  -0.042  0.050  -0.008  0.68 
     Age (male in couple)  -0.001 0.003 -1.3E-04  67.12
     High school (male in couple)  0.232***  0.041  0.045  0.28 
     Higher education (male in couple)  0.414***  0.046  0.088  0.17 
     At least one parent in bad health condition  -0.274***  0.051  -0.044  0.15 
     Number of members of HH  -0.012  0.025  -0.002  1.97 
     HH ppp income (in 10,000s)  0.019***  0.003  0.003  4.14 
Child characteristics            
     High school  0.088**  0.040  0.016  0.46 
     Higher education  0.113**  0.046  0.021  0.32 
     Married or living with couple  -0.163***  0.030  -0.031  0.68 
     Age  -0.021***  0.003  -0.004  38.40 
     Male  0.010  0.027  0.002  0.50 
     Yearly labour ppp income  -1.2E-05***  2.2E-06  -2.1E-06  13263.40 
     Yearly labour ppp income of siblings  2.7E-06  2.2E-06  4.9E-07  12794.40 
     Number of siblings  -0.178***  0.016  -0.032  2.15 
     Number of children  0.021*  0.013  0.004  1.32 
     Hours of help given to parents  2.0E-05  1.6E-05  3.6E-06  92.09 
     Contact with parents  0.001***  1.1E-04  1.1E-04  178.04 
     Distant from parental home  1.8E-04**  8.8E-05  3.2E-05  95.86 
     Germany  -0.100  0.069  -0.017  0.11 
     Sweden  0.269***  0.067  0.054  0.17 
     Netherlands  -0.010  0.069  -0.002  0.14 
     Spain  -0.505***  0.088  -0.070  0.10 
     Italy  -0.053  0.080  -0.009  0.09 
     France  -0.046   0.070  -0.008  0.13 
     Denmark  0.002   0.075  0.000  0.08 
     Greece  0.036   0.076  0.007  0.09 
     Constant  -0.179   0.162    0.00 
             
Number of observations  21109.0             
Log pseudolikelihood  -7389.2          
chi2(28) 1018.2           
Dependent variable mean  0.136             





















Tobit estimates for transfers received from parents 
 
Variable Coef.      Rob .Clus. Std. 
Err. 
Parental Characteristics          
     Male (in couple)  1552.049***  496.018 
     Married and living with couple  -760.097  543.715 
     Age (male in couple)  -4.969  31.378 
     High school (male in couple)  2285.643***  562.031 
     Higher education (male in couple)  4721.266***  915.228 
     At least one parent in bad health condition  -2994.454***  701.241 
     Number of members of HH  -51.288  276.269 
     HH ppp income (in 10,000s)  183.168***  41.655 
Child characteristics 
     High school  931.197**  459.434 
     Higher education  1465.817***  551.561 
     Married or living with couple  -1050.251***  325.278 
     Age  -226.775***  44.796 
     Male  56.734  320.567 
     Yearly labour ppp income  -0.086***  0.027 
     Yearly labour ppp income of siblings  0.053*  0.028 
     Number of siblings  -1709.302***  303.030 
     Number of children  103.681  149.981 
     Hours of help given to parents -0.055 0.175 
     Contact with parents  6.631***  1.663 
     Distant from parental home  1.962**  0.990 
     Germany  -1079.887  862.916 
     Sweden  1984.973**  811.568 
     Netherlands  -909.842  882.271 
     Spain  -5305.821***  1550.178 
     Italy  -54.657  1100.554 
     France  -696.069  895.606 
     Denmark  -365.223  876.634 
     Greece  1021.432 1054.368 
     Constant  -6618.422***  1980.858 
          
Number of observations  21109.0       
Log pseudolikelihood  -30970.9      
chi2(28) 75.8       
Dependent variable mean  2893.2       
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Table 8 
Probit estimates for giving equal transfers to all children 
 
Variable  Coef.  Robust 
Std. Err.  dF/dx Mean 
Parental Characteristics             
     Male (in couple)  -0.072  0.091  -0.025  0.75 
     Married or living with couple  0.174  0.116  0.059  0.74 
     Age (male in couple)  0.014***  0.004  0.005  63.30 
     High school (male in couple)  -0.031  0.093  -0.011  0.36 
     Higher education (male in couple)  -0.193**  0.096  -0.066  0.30 
     At least one parent in bad health condition  -0.256*  0.135  -0.083  0.08 
     Number of members of HH  -0.040  0.069  -0.014  1.94 
     HH ppp income (in 10,000s)  0.011  0.008  0.004  5.16 
     Number of children  -0.187***  0.048  -0.065  2.71 
Child characteristics             
     Difference in age (b)  -0.031*** 0.012 -0.011  5.51
     Difference in yearly labour ppp income (b)  -9.4E-06*  5.7E-06  -3.3E-06  7820.40 
     Difference in number of children (b)  -0.018  0.035  -0.006  1.11 
     Difference in hours of help given to parents (b)  -6.2E-06  3.6E-05  -2.2E-06  104.52 
     Difference in contact with parents (b)  -0.001**  3.4E-04 -2.9E-04  103.29 
     Difference in distant from parental home (a)  0.123  0.085  0.043  0.38 
     Germany  -0.170  0.156  -0.057  0.13 
     Sweden  0.361***  0.139  0.130  0.25 
     Netherlands  0.003  0.155  0.001  0.13 
     Spain  -0.584*  0.300  -0.168  0.03 
     Italy  -0.234  0.198  -0.076  0.05 
     France  0.089  0.156  0.031  0.12 
     Denmark  0.236  0.158  0.085  0.10 
     Greece  -0.650***  0.184  -0.189  0.10 
     Constant  -0.561 0.357   
              
Number of observations  1552            
Log pseudolikelihood  -885.82         
chi2(23) 140.37          
Dependent variable mean  0.318            
*** indicates significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.            
(a) Indicates the division of the min. over the max. value of the relevant variable for siblings   





















































*How much agree with: "Parents’ duty is to do their best for their children even at 




A. Optimal values for Ti 
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A4. Optimal value for T1=T2=T and derivatives. 
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B. Corner solutions for Ti 
 
Define the latent variable  p j C U C U z ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ = * evaluated at  0 = j T . Thus,  0 > j T  
when  0 * > z  and  0 = j T  otherwise. Let’s consider none child receives a transfer: 
0 = j T  for j=1,2, then  p j I I z 1 * − = β . Thus,   0 * < ∂ ∂ j I z  and  0 * > ∂ ∂ p I z  for 
j=1,2. The same results apply for the case of equal transfers by modifying the latent 
variable to  p k j C U C U C U z ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ = *  evaluated at  0 = = = T T T k j .  
 
This time consider one of the children is receiving a positive transfer:  0 > k T  and 
0 = j T  for  k j ≠ . For the child j, the latent variable is 







































j j T I
I T
I I

















C. Latent variable t* 
 
Define  
u e V V t − + = γ *  as a latent variable for which the parent gives equal transfers 
if  0 *> t , otherwise the parent gives unequal transfers. 
 
C1. Effects of the differences of income between siblings: 
 
Define  2 1 I I − = θ  as a measure for income inequality between siblings. Assume 
without loss of generality that 2 1 I I > and take derivative of t* w.r.t θ . If we maintain 
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 since  1 2 T T T > > . 
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θ
 as well. It does not matter 
which income varies, a raise of θ  always reduces the probability of giving equal 
transfers. 
 
 C2. Effects of the concern with fairness: 
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 which can take positive or negative values. 
           
D. Neutrality results 
 
As before, assume  2 1 I I > .   33
 
D1. Intergenerational neutrality results: 
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If we try  1 1 − = p dI dT , as is the case of the pure altruism setting, we get  2 / 2
2
2 − = C Cp β  
which is a contradiction. However,  1 1 − > p dI dT  always holds. And analogously to 
child 1,  1 2 − > p dI dT  always holds. Likewise,  p dI dT1 and  p dI dT2 are negative. 
 
D2. Intra-generational neutrality results: 
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If we try  1 1 1 − = dI dT , as is the case of the pure altruism setting, we get 
0 8 / 4
2 2
2
4 = + p p C C C γ βγ  which is a contradiction. Hence  1 1 1 − ≠ dI dT . And similarly, 
1 2 2 − ≠ dI dT . Likewise,  1 1 dI dT  can be positive or negative but  2 2 dI dT is negative: 
0
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